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Unsettling Events: Understanding PLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRgeopolitical transformative 
episodes through a life-course lens 
 
Abstract 
Migration under EU Freedom of Movement is constructed as temporary and circular, implying 
that migrants respond to changing circumstances by returning home or moving elsewhere. This 
construction underpins predictions of an exodus of EU migrants from the UK in the context of 
Brexit. While migration data indicate an increase in outflows since the vote to leave the EU, 
the scale does not FRQVWLWXWH D µ%UH[RGXV.¶ 0RUHRYHU (8 PLJUDQWV¶ applications for UK 
citizenship have been increasing. The data, though, are not sufficiently detailed to reveal who 
is responding to Brexit in which way. This article aims to offer a deeper understanding of how 
migrants experience and respond to changing geopolitical episodes such as Brexit. Introducing 
WKHWHUPµXQVHWWOLQJHYHQWV¶ we analyze data collected longitudinally, in the context of three 
moments of significant change: 2004 EU enlargement, 2008-09 economic recession, and 
Brexit. Examining our data, mainly on Polish migrants, through a life-course lens, our findings 
highlight the need to account for the situatedness of migrant experiences as lived in particular 
times (both personal and historical), places, and relationships. In so doing, we reveal various 
factors informing PLJUDQWV¶experiences of and reactions to unsettling events and the ways in 
which their experiences and reactions potentially impact on migration projects. 
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Introduction  
In June 2016, the UK electorate voted narrowly to leave the European Union (EU), beginning 
a process commonly referred to as Brexit. The high level of migration to the UK from the EU 
following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements1 was a central issue in the referendum (Kilkey 
2017), which took place six years into an austerity program focused on reducing government 
debt incurred during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Like the United States (Ybarra, 
Sanchez and Sanchez 2016) and other European countries (Czaika and Di Lillo 2018), the UK 
has witnessed increasing hostility toward migrants, especially since the EU enlargement and 
2008-09 recession which followed the GFC (Virdee and McGeever 2018). Moreover, since 
2010, successive Conservative UK governments have had a commitment in their political 
manifesto to reduce net migration to the µtens of thousands¶2  (Kilkey 2017). Within this 
climate, EU Freedom of Movement (FoM),3 which grants EU citizens the right to move to and 
reside in another EU member state and to receive equal treatment with nationals of the host 
state, was problematized as DOORZLQJµXQFRQWUROOHG¶PLJUDWLRQIURPWKH(8 (Kilkey 2017). The 
                                                          
1
 The 2004 enlargement involved the accession of ten new EU member states. Eight were 
Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), commonly known as the EU8. Malta and Cyprus 
were the other two. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and are commonly known 
as the EU2. 
2
 The net migration target was dropped by Prime Minister Boris Johnson on 25 July 2019. 
3
 EU FoM is enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and was developed by EU secondary legislation and the Case Law of the Court of Justice. As 
discussed below, the rights associated with it have qualifying conditions attached. 
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vote to leave the EU and subsequent negotiations between, on the one hand, the UK 
government and the European Council and, on the other, the UK government and UK 
Parliament, have triggered high levels of uncertainty about the future rights of EU citizens 
currently living in the UK (Kilkey 2017; Erel and Ryan 2019; McGhee, Moreh, and 
Vlachantoni 2017; Guma and Jones 2019). In this context, popular and academic commentary 
is predicting a mass exodus ± µ%UH[RGXV¶- of EU migrants from the UK (McKiernan 2017; 
Shapira 2018).  
 
The µBrexodus narrative¶ is informed by the rational-choice theory of migration, which, 
focusing on labor migration, treats migrants as rational economic actors (e.g., Sjaastad 1962; 
Todar 1969; Borjas 1987). The predLFWLRQVRIDµ%UH[RGXV¶DUHDOVRLQIRUPHGE\Dconstruction 
of intra-EU migration as a relatively frictionless movement across proximate and open borders 
and of EU migrants, particularly post-enlargement, as free-movers engaged in temporary and 
circular mobility (Engbersen and Snel 2013; Favell 2008). These constructions lead to an 
assumption that when circumstances change, EU migrants can and will move on from the UK 
(Engbersen, Snel, and De Boom 2010). Yet, while migration data indicate increasing outflows 
of EU migrants from the UK since the vote to leave the EU (ONS 2019), as we show below, 
the scale is not large enough to justify being termed D µ%UH[RGXV¶ Moreover, in the same 
period, (8PLJUDQWV¶applications for UK citizenship have increased (Home Office 2019). EU 
migrantV¶ DFWXDO UHVSRQVHV WR %UH[LW WKHUHIRUH VHHP PRUH GLYHUVH WKDQ SUHGLFWHG E\ WKH
dominant narrative. Neither the migration nor the citizenship data, however, are sufficiently 
detailed to provide understanding of why some EU migrants are leaving the UK while others 
are extending their stay. This shortcoming in the data contributes to masking the complexity 
that lies behind migration projects.  
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7KLVDUWLFOH¶Vfirst aim is to develop a more nuanced understanding of EU PLJUDQWV¶behavior 
in the face of Brexit. A small number of recent articles have explored the migration plans of 
EU migrants in the UK following the Brexit referendum (e.g., McGhee, Moreh, and 
Vlachantoni 2017; Guma and Jones 2018; Lulle, 0RURúDQXDQG King 2018; Lulle et al. 2019). 
This article contributes to that work by seeking to learn lessons from past relevant events to 
understand %UH[LW¶Vpotential impact on migration responses. We develop this temporal lens by 
introducing WKHQRWLRQRIµXQVHWWOLQJHYHQWV¶- political, social, and economic transformations 
with the potential to disrupt pre-existing migration projects. We focus on three unsettling 
events: Brexit, the UK 2008-09 economic recession, and the 2004 EU enlargement. We 
understand these events as interlinked because of the cumulative and spill-over effects of the 
changes each event sets in train. Thus, rather than seeing Brexit as a unique and isolated event, 
we take a longer-term view to develop wider understanding of SDWWHUQVLQPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHV 
to unsettling events over time.  
 
The DUWLFOH¶Vsecond aim is to analyze WKHUROHRIWLPHLQPLJUDQWV¶decisions about whether to 
extend the stay, return home, or move on elsewhere. To do so, ZHGUDZRQ*OHQ(OGHU¶V(1998) 
life-course framework, highlighting the situatedness of migrant experiences as lived in 
particular times (both personal and historical), places, and relationships. In the process, we 
counter prevalent neo-classical models of migrants as rational, individualized, economic actors 
(Sjaastad 1962; Todar 1969; Borjas 1987), recognizing PLJUDWLRQ DV µHPEHGGHG LQEURDGHU
QHWZRUNVRILQWHQVLYHVRFLDOFKDQJH¶3DSDGRSRXORVDQG7VLDQRV.  
 
Using a life-course lens raises methodological questions about how to capture change over time 
LQPLJUDQWV¶ OLYHV$VRWKHU researchers have acknowledgeG µWDNLQJ WLPHVHULRXVO\¶ $GDP
2000) is a challenge across the social sciences more broadly (McKie, Gregory and Bowlby 
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2002). Thus, WKLV DUWLFOH¶V third aim is to address those challenges through two innovative 
techniques. First, we combine three qualitative datasets collected by different teams and at 
different times to capture the three unsettling events under examination here. Second, we use 
longitudinal data from the same participants gathered over more than a decade as they lived 
through these interlinked unsettling events. The first technique provides us with the long view 
from which we can learn lessons about Brexit; the second allows us to capture the complex 
interplay between personal biographies and unsettling events, thereby nuancing understanding 
of PLJUDQWV¶potential responses to Brexit.  
 
Our article contributes to the emerging body of scholarship H[DPLQLQJ%UH[LW¶V LPSDFWV on 
migration projects. While that work acknowledges the importance of %UH[LW¶V temporal 
dynamics (e.g., Rzepnikowska 2019; Gawlewicz and Sotkasiira 2019), time remains 
underexplored in that literature (e.g., Lulle, 0RURúDQXDQG King 2018, Lulle et al. 2019). By 
adopting a life-course lens and drawing upon a longitudinal dataset, we highlight WLPH¶V
importance in examinations of %UH[LW¶V SRWHQWLDO LPSDFW RQ PLJUDQWV¶ PLJUDWRU\ SURMHFWV. 
Moreover, while much of the emerging scholarship treats Brexit as a unique and isolated event 
(Ranta and Nancheva, 2018), we emphasize the importance of learning lessons from the past 
by considering Brexit as part of a series of interlinked unsettling events. 
 
The data drawn upon in this article mainly concern Polish migrants, who constitute the largest 
group of EU migrants in the UK (ONS 2019). In the following sections, we develop our 
DQDO\VLVRIPLJUDQWV¶UHDFWLRQVWRWKHVHULHVRIWKUHHXQVHWWOLQJHYHQWV through our combined 
corpus of qualitative data. The concluding section highlights our methodological and 
conceptual contributions and their broader applicability to migration research. Before 
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introducing our data and methodology, however, we begin by critically engaging with framings 
of intra-EU migration, particularly post-enlargement, through the life-course lens.  
 
Intra-EU migration under FoM  
EU enlargement in 2004 extended FoM rights to more than 100 million additional persons4 and 
resulted in a large-VFDOH SRSXODWLRQ PRYHPHQW IURP (8 FRXQWULHV µDPRXQWLQJ WR VHYHUDO
PLOOLRQVRISHRSOH¶ (Luthra, Platt, and 6DODPRĔVND2018, 369). The extension of FoM rights 
not only transformed the scale of East-West European migration but also facilitated new types 
of migration (Favell 2008). Scholars have invoked a plethora of concepts to describe these new 
forms of mobility: temporariness, circularity, pendulum mobility (Okolski 2004; Fihel and 
Grabowska-Lusinska 2014), intentional unpredictability (Eade, Garapich, and Drinkwater 
2008), and liquidity (Engbersen, Snel, and De Boom 2010; Engbersen and Snel 2013). These 
conceptual framings are explicitly based on constructing EU8 migrants as young individuals 
whose migration is economically motivated and ZKR ZLOO µUHVSRQG DQG DGDSW TXLFNO\ WR
FKDQJLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶ (Engbersen and Snel 2013, 31) EHFDXVH)R0ULJKWVDOORZWKHPWRµFRPH
DQGJRDVWKH\FKRRVH¶RSFLW, 37). 
 
Such a construction of EU8 migrants is in line with the free-market values underpinning FoM, 
according to which, and drawing on a neo-classical rational choice model of migration (King 
2018), intra-EU mobility is central to EU economic integration (Boswell and Geddes 2011). 
The )R0¶Vroots, for example, lie in Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome - the founding Treaty of 
                                                          
4
 For citizens of the EU8 countries, access to full FoM rights were restricted for up to seven 
years by most EU15 countries. The exceptions were the UK, Sweden, and Ireland, which 
immediately granted relatively unrestricted access (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013, 68).  
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the European Economic Community in 1957.5 Its inclusion then was prompted by a desire to 
promote labor mobility as a factor of production, and it, thus, applied WRµZRUNHUV¶RQO\ (Recchi 
and Favell 2009). FoM has evolved significantly since that time and expanded in three respects 
(Ackers 1998). First, it now incorporates ZRUNHUV¶family members (ibid.). Second, it makes 
illegal all nationality-based discrimination between workers of member states in terms of work 
conditions, pay, unemployment benefits, access to social and tax benefits, and training (ibid.).6 
Third, it breaks the link between free movement and worker status by widening the focus from 
µZRUNHUV¶WRµSHUVRQV¶VXFKWKDWLQIree movement, residency, and equal treatment were 
explicitly extended to qualifying non-economically active categories of EU citizens (and their 
families) ± students, pensioners, and the unemployed,7 culminating in the introduction of a 
common European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (ibid.).  
 
In comparison with free-movement regimes in other regional associations and trade 
DJUHHPHQWVLQFOXGLQJWKRVHZLWKWKHµWKLFNHVW¶conceptualization of supranational citizenship, 
such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Caribbean Community, and the Common Market of 
the South (Strumia 2017), FoM stands out for its combination of mobility, residency, labor 
market, and social rights. 7KH)R0¶Vexpansiveness is especially significant because, as we 
                                                          
5
 There was an earlier precedent for free movement provisions in the European Coal and Steel 
Community founded in 1951, Article 69 of which provided for cross-border movement 
EHWZHHQ WKH WKHQ VL[ PHPEHUV RI µZRUNHUV ZKR DUH QDWLRQDOV RI PHPEHU VWDWHV DQG KDYH
UHFRJQL]HG TXDOLILFDWLRQV LQ D FRDOPLQLQJ RU VWHHOPDNLQJ RFFXSDWLRQ¶ https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:11951K:EN:PDF, accessed 28/09/19) 
6
 These two developments were part of the 1968 Council Regulation 1612/68. 
7
 This extension of rights followed the Single European Act of 1986.  
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argue below, it allowed workers and their families not only to move but also, importantly, to 
extend their stay. Nonetheless, that is not to argue that the economic utilitarianism 
underpinning WKH)R0¶Vinception has lost its hold. As Ackers (2004) reminds us, the extension 
of family rights to mobile EU workers was motivated by the sole purpose of removing obstacles 
to ZRUNHUV¶ cross-border mobility. Moreover, even amid expansion of FoM rights to all EU 
citizens, the legacy of privileging workers persists. Thus, conditions attached to FoM are tighter 
for non-economically active categories of EU citizens than for economically active categories 
(Bruzelius, Chase, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2016). Despite those important qualifiers, our point is 
that under FoM, while EU8 nationals had the right to engage continuously in back-and-forth 
transnational movement as neo-liberal migrant subjects, they also had the right, through 
residency provisions, and the capacity, through equal treatment and access to social provisions, 
to extend their stays in the destination country (Kilkey, Plomien, and Perrons 2014; Ryan et al. 
2008). 
 
In other words, under FoM people may not only move to other member states but also 
experience periods of extending their stay or embedding in place over time (Ryan 2018). 
Hence, recognizing the PLJUDWLRQSURMHFW¶Vdynamism is crucial in our analysis, raising the 
issue of time, a subject of growing interest to migration researchers (Cwerner 2001; King et al. 
2006; Griffiths, Rogers, and Anderson 2013; Collins and Shubin 2015; Robertson and Ho 2016; 
Mavrouti, Page, and Christou 2017). While young migrants may keep their plans open ended 
(see Collins and Shubin 2015), over time these plans may be revisited and change against the 
backdrop of dynamic familial responsibilities and wider contextual circumstances. As 
3DSDGRSRXORVDQG7VLDQRVQRWHµPLJUDWLRQFKDUDFWHULVHVWKHFRQWLQXRXVVKLIWVDQG
radical re-articulation of individual trajectories¶ 5\DQ¶Vresearch has shown that, especially in 
the context of EU FoM, migration plans change and many who initially anticipated temporary 
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sojourns gradually extend their stays (Ryan et al. 2008; 2009; Ryan and Sales 2013). As time 
passes, migrants may deveORSµVRFLDODQFKRUV¶Grzymala-Kazlowska 2016), their lives may 
becoPH µJURXQGHG¶ %\JQHV DQG (UGDO 2017), and they may EHJLQ µHPEHGGLQJ¶ LQ ORFDO
contexts (Ryan and Mulholland 2015; Ryan 2018). Hence, as shown throughout our data 
sections, treating migration as a project that evolves over time and across the life course is key 
WRQXDQFLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRXQVHWWOLQJHYHQWVVXFKDV%UH[LW.   
 
The life-course framework 
In this article, to understand the dynamics of migration projects, we draw on the work of Glen 
Elder (1998). According to Elder¶V life-course framework, µWLPH RSHUDWHV DW ERWK D
VRFLRKLVWRULFDODQGSHUVRQDOOHYHO¶ (Elder, Kirkpatrick Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003, 8). In other 
words, our lives are socially organized LQ µELRJUDSKLFDO DQGKLVWRULFDO WLPHV¶ZLWK resultant 
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUKRZZHµWKLQNIHHODQGDFW¶(OGHU, 9). Of course, we are mindful that 
(OGHU¶Vlife-course framework has been criticized for its assumed linearity (e.g., Collins and 
Shubin 2015). Clearly, as our data sections below demonstrate, lives do not follow an even or 
predictable path. Nonetheless, as other studies have shown (see Carling 2017), adopting a linear 
approach to historical time enables researchers to understand how socio-structural events 
LPSDFWPLJUDQWV¶SHUVRQDOOLIHQarratives.  
 
(OGHU¶V (1998) work demonstrates how the historical era and geographical place in which 
individuals are situated make a difference for their opportunities and life chances. Historical 
events, however, are not all experienced in the same way. Personal timing matters. For 
example, whether one is a small, dependent child, a single young adult, or an older adult with 
family responsibilities will impact how one experiences a significant societal event such as an 
economic recession. 7KXVWKHµVDPHHvents or experiences may affect individuals in different 
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ZD\V GHSHQGLQJ RQ ZKHQ WKH\ RFFXU LQ WKH OLIH FRXUVH¶ (OGHU .LUNSDWULFN Johnson, and 
Crosnoe 2003, 12).  That is not to suggest that historical time and personal notions of time are 
necessarily synchronized but rather that the former may provide a framing context to the latter 
(Plummer 1995).   
 
Such framing contexts, of course, also depend on particular geographical locations (Ryan 
2015); thus, place matters as well. Drawing on Gieryn (2000), Elder and colleagues understand 
SODFHDVSRVVHVVLQJµgeographical location; a material form or culture of one kind or another; 
and inYHVWPHQWZLWKPHDQLQJDQGYDOXH¶ (Elder, Kirkpatrick Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003, 12). 
Acknowledging SODFH¶V importance to understanding how significant societal events are 
experienced is especially relevant to intra-EU migrants, who, because of their right to engage 
in back-and-forth mobility, risk being portrayed as living de-territorialized lives (Kilkey and 
Merla 2014). Rather, we argue, (8PLJUDQWVOLYHWKHLUOLYHVµVLWXDWHG¶LQVSHFLILFSODFHVibid.), 
and their relationship to these places is continuously made and re-made over time through 
processes of embedding (Ryan and Mulholland 2015).  
 
This notion of place-making highlights that people are not passive in the face of wider social 
forces. :H ILQG (OGHU¶V emphasis on agency especially useful in this regard: µindividuals 
construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take within the 
opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstances¶ (OGHU 1998, 4). (OGHU¶V
work, however, goes beyond a narrow focus on individual agency to highlight the principle of 
µOLQNHGOLYHV¶ - µOLYHVDUHOLYHGLQWHUGHSHQGHQWO\¶, 4). Such linkages point to the salience 
of networks of kinship, friendship, and professional others. The principle of µOLQNHGOLYHV¶ is 
especially relevant in migration studies, as decisions about when and where to move, how long 
to stay, and whether to return home or move on elsewhere are often made in relation to 
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networks of inter-personal relationships situated in specific life stages, structural opportunities, 
and constraints (Ryan et al. 2008; 2018; Schewel 2019). As we argue below, such linkages are 
especially relevant in how migrants react to unsettling events. 
 
(OGHU¶V IUDPHZRUN, then, helps us understand migration decision-making as complex and 
contingent upon time, place, and relationality. Furthermore, we respond to recent calls 
(Gawlewicz and Sotkasiira 2019) WREULQJDWHPSRUDOOHQVLQWRDQDO\VHVRIPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHV
to Brexit, as this perspective has been underplayed in the emerging literature. We draw on 
(OGHU¶V notion of historical and biographical time to analyze qualitative life narratives and 
longitudinal data collected over more than a decade. In so doing, we consider how participants 
responded to particular unsettling events, which we define in the next section. 
 
µ8QVHWWOLQJHYHQWV¶ 
(OGHU¶V life-course framework highlights the role of significant societal events, such as the 
Great Depression and World War II, in mediating lives (Elder, Kirkpatrick Johnson, and 
Crosnoe 2003). We draw on this important contribution in our attempt to understand how 
SHRSOH¶s migration projects are impacted by events such as Brexit, by introducing the notion 
of µunsettling events¶ Unsettling events are transformations on the structural level that have 
implications on the individual level in ways that provoke re-evaluation of migration projects. 
Geopolitical episodes which have unsettling potential for migrants may be isolated events in 
history, but they may also be intertwined, in part because of the cumulative and spill-over 
effects of the changes each event puts in train. Whereas these geopolitical episodes are 
experienced simultaneously by migrant populations (Miller 2019), biographical events, such 
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as bereavement or illness, are not. 8  While geopolitical events are shared, how they are 
experienced is highly differentiated because migrants are positioned unevenly in relation to the 
unsettling processes that ensue (Guma and Jones 2019; Lulle et al. 2019; Benson and Lewis 
2019). Moreover, migrantV¶HYDOXDWLRQVRI unsettling events in the destination country may be 
shaped by circumstances elsewhere, including in the home country. Thus, we suggest, 
PLJUDQWV¶responses are likely to vary, as we further discuss in our data sections. 
 
In this article, we understand the processes triggered by unsettling events as multi-layered, 
consisting of interlinked material, relational, and subjective dimensions. The material 
dimension refers to aspects such as PLJUDQWV¶income, employment, and socio-legal status. The 
relational refers to the relationships migrants, as individuals and as members of wider 
collectivities, have to the society in which they live. These relationships take the form of 
everyday interpersonal social relations and interactions with individuals and institutions, as 
well as PLJUDQWV¶ VWUXFWXUDO DQG GLVFXUVLYH SRVLWLRQLQJV relative to other groups. 9  The 
subjective dimension, finally, refers to what meanings migrants give to their circumstances and 
how they evaluate them. It captures the affective aspects of unsettling processes and includes 
feelings and emotions around belonging, identity, status security, and wellbeing. Each 
dimension may not have equal salience in every event, and within one event, positive changes 
in one dimension may be accompanied by negative changes in another dimension, such that 
                                                          
8
 They are also experienced by non-migrant populations, but this article focuses only on how 
migrants experience them. 
9
 While our focus is on interpersonal relations, we acknowledge that other relationalities, such 
as with objects, may be relevant. 
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unsettling events can have contradictory effects, even for the same individual. The remainder 
of this section outlines the three unsettling events on which our analysis focuses.  
 
EU enlargement 
Following EU enlargement in 2004, Poland experienced the greatest volume of out-migration 
of all accession countries (Luthra, Platt, and 6DODPRĔVND 2018), and the UK became the main 
destination (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013; Ryan et al. 2008; White et al. 2018). Between 
2004 and 2017, the Polish-born population in the UK increased from 94,000 to over 900,000 
(see Table 1), and by 2015 Poland had become the most common birth country among the 
8.¶VIRUHLJQ-born population, displacing India (ONS 2019). Most of these new arrivals were 
young, with a high proportion aged 20-24 (Okolski and Salt 2014).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The UK was 3ROLVKPLJUDQWV¶ main destination in part because it was one of only three EU15 
countries that immediately granted relatively unrestricted FoM rights to citizens of the new 
member states (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013).10 FoM rights not only provided the socio-
legal basis for people to migrate from Poland to the UK but also allowed undocumented Polish 
migrants already in the UK to regularize their status (ibid.). Enlargement, through the 
acquisition of FoM rights, therefore, unsettled pre-existing circumstances for Polish migrants 
                                                          
10
 EU8 citizens were required to register with the Worker Registration Scheme to work in the 
UK, and their access to welfare benefits was restricted. Following 12 months of continuous 
registered employment, EU8 citizens were entitled to full free movement labor rights and 
welfare benefits. 
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in the material, relational and subjective fields in ways which might be expected to open their 
opportunities as migrants in the UK. There were also contradictory forces at work, however. 
Ahead of enlargement, the UK tabloid press criticized UK government policy, warning of the 
µIORRG¶ WKDW ZRXOG HQVXH from Central and Eastern European countries and, in particular 
Poland, the largest of these countries.11 Within a few years, anti-EU8 and anti-Polish sentiment 
ZDV SUHYDOHQW LQ WKH 8.¶V WDEORLG press (Fitzgerald and Smoczynski 2015), and the then 
&RQVHUYDWLYHRSSRVLWLRQDFFXVHGWKH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQWRIµORVLQJFRQWURO¶RYHUPLJUDWLRQ, 
sparking the problematization of EU migration noted in our introduction.12 
 
Economic recession 
Our second unsettling event is the economic recession, beginning in the UK in 2008 after the 
2007 GFC and ending in ODWH7KHUHFHVVLRQVDZWKH8.¶V*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGXFWIDOO
by over six percent, and almost 900,000 jobs disappeared from its labor market (Gregg and 
Wadsworth 2010).  As unemployment increased, anti-immigrant sentiment intensified in public 
discourse, with Poles receiving the most hostility (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013; 
Fitzgerald and Smoczynski 2015; Rzepnikowska 2019). At the time of the recession, the Polish 
economy grew, and its currency strengthened relative to the British Pound (Kilkey, Perrons, 
and Plomien 2013). 3ROLVKPLJUDQWV¶material, relative, and subjective circumstances could be 
expected to have changed with the recession. Indeed, against this background, there was much 
academic interest in how Polish migrants would respond in terms of using their EU FoM rights 
to return or move to other EU member states (Pollard, Latorre, and Sriskandarajah 2008; 
                                                          
11
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/23/eu.poland, accessed 28/09/19. 
12
 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/oct/30/immigration.immigrationpolicy, accessed 
28/09/19. 
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Glossop and Shaheen 2009; Finch et al. 2009; Engbersen and Snel 2013).  In our data sections, 
we consider the extent to which these predictions were realized. 
 
Brexit 
Our third and final unsettling event is Brexit. As argued above, the high level of migration to 
the UK following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements was a central issue in the referendum. 
Moreover, the referendum took place against the backdrop of an austerity program and deep 
public-sector spending cuts introduced by the Conservative-Liberal coalition government 
following the recession (Grundmann, Kreischer and Scott 2017). Hence, although we discuss 
these events as separate episodes, they are connected and entangled in the spill-over and 
accumulation of increased hostility toward EU migrants. Emerging with EU enlargement in 
2004, this hostility became especially manifest following the 2008 recession and came to a 
head with the 2016 referendum and its aftermath (Virdee and McGeever 2018). Reported hate 
crimes against migrants have increased since the referendum (Home Office 2017), and Polish 
citizens, as the largest and highest-profile group of recent EU migrants, have experienced 
heightened racism and xenophobia (Rzepnikowska 2019; Guma and Jones 2019). While Brexit 
remains an unfolding event at the time of this writing (January 2020), since the referendum 
result, much uncertainty has surrounded the future rights of EU citizens currently living in the 
UK once EU FoM between the UK and its former EU partners ceases. This uncertainty creates 
insecurities around socio-legal statusZKLFKUHVHDUFKHUVGHVFULEHDVµXQVHWWOLQJ¶*XPDDQG
Jones 2019; Ranta and Nancheva 2019). Moreover, since the referendum, the pound and UK 
16 
 
economy have both been volatile.13 Thus, as in the case of enlargement and the recession, 
Brexit is widely considered to have the potential to disrupt pre-existing migration projects of 
Poles and other EU migrants vis-à-vis the UK (McGhee, Moreh, and Vlachantoni 2017; Ranta 
and Nancheva 2019).   
 
Understanding Brexit as an unsettling event, as defined above, enables us to do three things. 
First, it helps us examine how this structural-level geopolitical transformation is experienced 
by migrants on an individual level, depending upon their diverse social positionings. Second, 
conceiving of Brexit as part of a series of interlinked unsettling events (along with EU 
enlargement in 2004 and the 2008-09 economic recession), rather than a unique and isolated 
geopolitical episode, and following the life-course framework (Elder 1998) draw attention to 
WKHKLVWRULFDOWLPHVZLWKLQZKLFKPLJUDQWV¶ELRJUDSKLHVSRVLWLRQLQJV, and migration projects 
need to be understood. Third, seeing Brexit as one of a series of unsettling events enables us to 
OHDUQIURPSUHYLRXVH[SHULHQFHVWRGHYHORSXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISDWWHUQVLQPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHV
over time.  In this way, we go beyond the work exploring %UH[LW¶VSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRQPLJUDQWV¶
migratory projects solely in the present moment (e.g., Lulle, 0RURúDQXDQG King 2018; Lulle 
et al. 2019; Ranta and Nancheva, 2018) and engage the important lessons that can be learned 
from previous unsettling events WRGHHSHQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPLJUDQWV¶SRWHQWLDOUHVSRQVHVWR
Brexit.   
 
Methodology 
                                                          
13
 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46862790, accessed 28/09/19; 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/report/2018/eu-withdrawal-scenarios-and-monetary-and-
financial-stability, accessed 28/09/19.  
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How the process and experience of change over time can be studied has vexed social scientists 
(Adam 2000; McKie, Gregory and Bowlby 2002; Corden and Millar 2007; Neale, Henwood, 
and Holland 2012; Erel and Ryan 2019). One strategy for addressing this challenge has been 
to adopt a longitudinal approach which allows XVµWRFRQVWUXFWDVWRU\RIDOLIHZKLFKLVJUHDWHU
than the sum of its parts (the individual interview), making it possible to gain insight into 
underlying biographical and social proFHVVHVDWSOD\¶7KRPVRQ, 577). While a one-off 
interview can provide a snap-shot of participants¶ experiences, plans, and aspirations, 
repeatedly re-interviewing participants can allow researchers to gain a deeper understanding of 
life-course dynamics, changing circumstances, and evolving migration plans. This approach 
DOORZVXVWRPDNHDQRYHOFRQWULEXWLRQWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWR%UH[LW:KLOH
some of the recent literature on Brexit includes repeated rounds of data collection, these studies 
either involved different participants (e.g., Ranta and Nancheva 2018) or occurred within a 
very short timeframe, such as one year (e.g., Lulle et al. 2019). We argue that re-visiting and 
re-connecting with participants over many years provide valuable insights into how migration 
evolves through time, illuminating the dynamic relationships between people and the places in 
which their lives are situated.  
 
Three sets of data inform our analysis. Author Louise Ryan has been researching migration for 
approximately two decades, with a particular focus on intra-EU mobility. She has an 
established body of work on Polish migration built over several research projects, including 
longitudinal work following particular Polish migrants over more than a decade (Ryan et al. 
2016).  In 2004-6, with colleagues, Ryan conducted a study on recently arrived Polish migrants 
in London, interviewing 30 participants (there were also three focus groups and several key 
informant interviews; thus, over 50 people took part in that initial study). That original study 
aimed to explore reasons for migration, use of social networks, and expected duration of stay. 
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In 2014, Ryan conducted research with 20 Polish migrants resident in the UK for approximately 
ten years (Ryan 2018). That study aimed to understand how migration plans, especially initial 
expressions of temporariness and uncertainty, may develop over time into extensions of their 
stay. Nine of these participants had been interviewed previously by Ryan and colleagues. Ryan 
re-contacted all 20 participants in 2016 to gauge their reactions to the EU Referendum, thus 
developing a large corpus of longitudinal data from these migrants. As discussed below, these 
data clearly reflect the evolution of migration plans over time in the context of particular places 
and in relation to significant others. It is possible, of course, that being involved in this study 
over time has contributed WR SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ UHIOH[LYLW\ DERXW WKHLU PLJUDWLRQ SODQs. It seems 
unlikely, however, that being interviewed three times over a ten-year period would have 
impacted those migration plans.  
 
Author Majella Kilkey draws on data collected, with colleagues, in 2008-09 in England as part 
of a larger project exploring the outsourcing of masculinized forms of domestic work and its 
displacement to migrant men. A key aim of that study was to understand the determinants of 
the supply of migrant handymen, their migration paths, and experiences of work and family 
life (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013). In the UK, post-DFFHVVLRQ µKDQG\PDQZRUN¶ has 
become a labor-market niche for Polish men. Among the 80-plus semi-structured interviews 
conducted for that project, 21 were with Polish handymen and three with representatives of 
Polish handyman companies. This article draws on those interviews, focusing specifically on 
migration H[SHULHQFHVDJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRI3RODQG¶VEU DFFHVVLRQDQGWKH8.¶VHFRQRPLF
recession, during which the research project took place.   
 
This article brings together the above datasets. During the writing process, we spent 
considerable time discussing our data and sharing examples of specific participants from the 
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various studies, as well as how these examples might be incorporated in the article. Our re-
visiting of the datasets was theory driven, informed by concepts developed in our previous 
separate research (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013; Kilkey and Merla 2014; Ryan 2018). 
Although collected at different times and by different teams, these studies were markedly 
similar in the research questions they addressed, facilitating our re-analysis. Collectively, we 
identified particular cases of individuals whose experiences enabled us to test concepts and 
build our argument (Stanley 2015). While not claiming to be representative, these individuals 
reflect wider patterns across our datasets.   
 
We collected the third set of data together, with colleagues, at a public event on Brexit and EU 
FLWL]HQV¶rights in Sheffield, a medium-sized UK city, in Autumn 2017. The event involved an 
µH[SHUWSDQHO¶RIJXHVWVSHDNHUVDQGwas attended by over 70 people. We distributed postcards 
and asked attendees to write anonymized responses to the question: µ:KDWLV\RXUPDLQFRQFHUQ
IRU (8 1DWLRQDOV LQ WKH 8. DIWHU %UH[LW"¶ 37 of those attending, spanning a total of 14 
nationalities, responded by writing short (two- or three-line) responses on postcards. We 
present analysis of these data through the three following sections. 
 
EU enlargement and FoM rights 
Although all data were collected after EU enlargement in 2004, some participants had come to 
the UK in the years prior to that enlargement. They had come as students or on tourist visas, 
but with the intention of staying longer than six months and finding work, or on a so-called 
µVHOI-HPSOR\HG¶ YLVD 7KH ODWWHU ZDV D OHJDO PLJUDWLRQ URXWH WR WKH 8. IRU DFFHVVLRQ-state 
nationals throughout the decade prior to enlargement and had been especially popular with 
Polish citizens (Eade, Garapich, and Drinkwater 2008). For those with a pre-2004 migration 
experience, whether in the UK or elsewhere, irregularity was a common feature of their 
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situation. As a result, migration was ofteQDULVN\EXVLQHVVDVUHYHDOHGE\$GDPµ,KDGWRWDOO\
no permit to work, so I was caught in Germany because I worked illegally there. I was arrested. 
7KHQ>LQ@,ZDVGHSRUWHGWR3RODQG¶,QWHUYLHZHGE\Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). Adam 
left Poland immediately for the UK and described in detail the preparations he made to secure 
HQWU\ DW WKH ERUGHU µ:H SUHSDUHG RXUVHOYHV IRU WKDW SURSHUO\ :H ERUURZHG TXLWH D ORW RI
PRQH\:HERXJKWIDQF\FORWKHV«EUDQGV(YHU\RQHRIXV« No one was stupid. Everyone 
FRXOGVSHDNDELWRI(QJOLVK$QGZHFKRVHWKHPRVWH[SHQVLYHIOLJKWRQSXUSRVH«,WZDVOLNH
FROOHFWLQJ SRLQWV WR JHW LQ ,W DOO DGGHG XS DQG RQH DIWHU DQRWKHU ZH PDQDJHG WR HQWHU¶
(Interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). In 2003, however, returning to the UK from a 
WULSWR3RODQG$GDPZDVUHIXVHGHQWU\DQGGHSRUWHGµ$QG\RXNQRZVXGGHQO\, I had to stay 
in Poland. I already had everything here [London]: a flat, furniture, bike, and friends. Suddenly, 
,ORVWHYHU\WKLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZHGE\ Kilkey and colleagues; cited in Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 
2013, 70).  
 
Mateusz arrived in the UK as a student in 1998. Like Adam, he recalled the various strategies 
UHTXLUHGHYHU\WLPHKHQHHGHGWRFURVVWKHERUGHUµKDYLQJWRH[SODLQ\RXUVHOI ³,¶PKHUHWR
study English,´ DQG , QHYHU GLG VWXG\ (QJOLVK« WKH GHSRVLW SDLG WR QXPHURXV VFKRRO RI
languages, you know, Mickey Mouse School of Languages, which sort of allowed me to return 
WLPHDQGWLPHDJDLQ¶,QWHUYLHZHGE\Ryan, 2014). Ewa, who also arrived in the UK before 
DFFHVVLRQQHHGHGDZRUNSHUPLWWRHQWHUWKH8.µ,KDGWRJRWKURXJKDOOWKHSDSHUZRUN, and 
I had to get a proper visa. It ZDVTXLWHDELJGHDOLQWKRVHWLPHV¶,QWHUYLHZHGE\Ryan, 2006).  
 
These examples illustrate the ways in which participants sought to navigate the barriers to 
migration, prior to Poland joining the EU. They took personal risks, made sacrifices, and 
negotiated migration obstacles through both formal and informal means. Even with these 
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efforts, migration regimes limited their geographical and social mobility. Thus, gaining EU 
FoM rights in 2004 had transformative implications for all participants, disrupting pre-existing 
migration projects. Adam, discussed above, spent a year in Poland, µthinking all the time about 
*UHDW %ULWDLQ« 7KHQ WKH ERUGHUV ZHUH RSHQ :H MRLQHG WKH 8QLRQ ,W¶V IUHHGRP ILQDOO\¶ 
(Interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). For Mateusz, also discussed above, Polish 
accession and his newly acquired rights as an EU citizen marked a major transformation in his 
lived experiences in British society, and he quickly decided to study nursing.   
 
In November 2004, just six months after EU enlargement, Louise Ryan and colleagues 
conducted a focus group in London with young Poles, who reflected on the difference FoM 
rights had made to them. One participant stated, µ,IHHODELJIUHHGRPQRZ« like a normal 
human being. Before, [I felt] OLNHDUDW¶Ryan and colleagues, Focus Group 2004). This quote 
powerfully demonstrates how EU enlargement and associated FoM changed 3ROLVKPLJUDQWV¶ 
status and subjectivity in the UK, from feeling like µa rat¶ scurrying and hiding in the shadows 
to a µnormal¶ member of society. Thus, experiences of the UK were being made and re-made 
over time against the backdrop of EU enlargement and of gaining status as EU citizens. 
Considering enlargement as an unsettling event, we can see how this structural transformation 
was experienced on the individual level in ways that transformed LQGLYLGXDOV¶migration plans. 
 
However, this transformation was not entirely positive. The focus group also noted the 
EDFNODVK µSDQLF,¶ DQG VFDUH PRQJHULQJ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LQFUHDVLQJ PLJUDWLRQ 6RPH
newspapers warned of Polish µKRUGHV¶VZDUPLQJWR/RQGRQ.14 Focus-group participants were 
VHQVLWLYHWRWKHVHUHSRUWVµ,heard that on the first weekend in May [2004] 40,000 people came 
                                                          
14
 https://www.economist.com/europe/2004/01/15/the-coming-hordes, accessed 28/09/19. 
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to London from Poland¶ $QRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWUHFDOOHGµSDQLF¶DERXWMREVEHFDXVHµORWVRI3ROLVK
people were coming¶ The findings from this focus group visibly capture the (8HQODUJHPHQW¶V 
unsettling impact for migrants, simultaneously transforming their status in the UK while 
causing increased anti-migrant hostility in some quarters of British society. Moreover, while 
FoM made geographical mobility possible, many participants initially experienced downward 
social mobility and were deskilled in the UK labor market (Ryan 2011). Ewa, for example, 
although a graduate from a Polish university, upon arrival in London got a job in the care sector, 
working well below her qualifications (Interviewed by Ryan, 2006). (ZD¶VH[SHULHQFHSRLQWV
to the contradictions of unsettling events, even for the same individual: while her socio-legal 
status improved, her relational positioning in UK society remained that of a migrant, rather 
than a fellow EU citizen.  
 
Many participants arrived in the UK with short-term and uncertain plans (Kilkey, Perrons, and 
Plomien 2013; Ryan and Sales 2013). In that respect they appear to conform to the notions of 
temporary and circular migration discussed earlier. Magda, first interviewed by Louise in 2006, 
arrived in the UK in 2004 as a student. She waited until Poland joined the EU so that she would 
QRWKDYHWRSD\RYHUVHDVVWXGHQWIHHVµWKHFRVWRIWKHVWXGLHVZere HQRUPRXVLI\RXZHUHQ¶W
IURP(XURSHDQ8QLRQ« It was just an enormous amount of money, DQG ,FRXOGQ¶WSD\ LW¶ 
Shortly after Poland joined the EU, she began a course in Architectural Technology at a London 
university. When first interviewed, Magda was determined to return to Poland after she and 
her Polish bR\IULHQGFRPSOHWHGWKHLUVWXGLHVµ*REDFNWR3RODQGDIWHUFRXSOHRI\HDUVEHFDXVH
if I want to have babies, I want to have them in Poland¶ Longitudinal data, however, reveal 
how migration projects can change through the life course. Hence, we return to Magda later 
and consider how her plans developed over time. 
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Participants widely acknowledged FoM rights as giving them the opportunity and confidence 
to engage in short-term migrations with little prior planning, as Jakub, who arrived in 2007, 
demonstrated ZKHQDVNHGDERXWKLVIXWXUHPLJUDWLRQSODQVµWho knows what will happen in 
a month, two or three? We are in the global village. The European Union gave us the 
SRVVLELOLWLHVWREHHYHU\ZKHUHDWKRPH¶,QWHUYLHZHGE\Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). Klaudia 
arrived in London with her young son in 2005 to join her husband, who had already been 
working in the city for six months when she arrived. This pattern of women and children joining 
husbands in the UK was common, especially in the years following accession (Kilkey, 
Plomien, and Perrons 2014; Ryan et al. 2009). These data about family reunion reflect the FoM 
expansion beyond workers, as discussed earlier. At that time, Klaudia did not have any idea 
DERXWKRZORQJVKHZRXOGVWD\µ,ZDVQ¶WGHFLGHG,KDYHQ¶W decided back then: should I leave? 
6KRXOG,VWD\"6KRXOGZHJRIRUDQRWKHUFRXQWU\"¶Interviewed by Ryan, 2014). FoM rights 
gave .ODXGLD¶V family the ability to keep their options open and not to make any long-term 
commitment to stay. However, as discussed below, the passage of time and evolving life course 
make a difference to migration projects (Kilkey, Plomien, and Perrons 2014; Ryan and Sales 
2013). In the next section, we begin to illustrate this argument by focusing on the ways in which 
the economic recession ± as an unsettling event - impacted migration projects. 
 
Economic recession 
All the Polish handymen interviewed by Kilkey were aware of the economic recession affecting 
the UK at the time of fieldwork, and there was a general feeling of insecurity around their 
future livelihoods. Reflecting on the pre-2007 period, handymen noted that they had been 
booked for several months in advance, often with a number of big and small jobs lined up and 
with their phones ringing µ100 times a day¶ (Dawid, interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 
2009). With the recession, the Polish handymen noticed that there was far less demand for their 
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work: µthis week, I have made about 100 phone calls to ask for a job. It is very hard¶ (Wojtek, 
interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009; cited in Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013, 90). 
Some reported downtime and work stoppages lasting from days to weeks, despite reducing 
their prices by as much as 30 percent. Participants, therefore, experienced a deterioration in 
their living standards, and those sending remittances home were also worried about the British 
SRXQG¶Vfalling value against the Polish Zloty.  
 
Moreover, some handymen spoke of increasing hostility toward Polish workers: the recession 
exacerbated the tabloid-press narrative, present from enlargement, of Poles threatening British 
workers (Fitzgerald and Smoczynski 2015), and then Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared 
a commitment to securing 'British jobs for British workers¶ 15  Fryderyk reported that 
prospective employers now asked where he was from, which they had not done in the past. 
When asked to reflect on why this difficulty in finding jobs was happening, he reported: 
͚%HFDXVH WKH\ GRQ¶W ZDQW WR HPSOR\ IRUHLJQHUV IURP (DVtern Europe, Romanians, Polish 
SHRSOH 6LQFH WKH UHFHVVLRQ VWDUWHG WKH\ GRQ¶W HPSOR\ XV¶ (Interviewed by Kilkey and 
colleagues, 2009). 
 
In the context of deteriorating economic and political circumstances wrought by the recession 
and against the backdrop of configurations of intra-EU mobility as temporary and circular, 
commentators predicted large-scale return migration to Poland (Pollard, Latorre, and 
Sriskandarajah 2008; Finch et al. 2009). Based on return patterns in two Polish towns located 
in regions with some of the highest rates of post-2004 outward migration, White (2011), 
                                                          
15
  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/30/brown-british-jobs-workers, accessed 
28/09/19. 
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however, argues that the scale of Polish return in the recession era was exaggerated. Indeed, as 
Table 1 above indicates, the Polish population in the UK continued to grow through the 
recessionary years. Migration flow data are not available at the country level, but those for the 
EU8 countries as a whole indicate that while outflows peaked in 2008 and 2009, the scale of 
return was relatively low compared to what was predicted ± less than 10 percent and 7 percent 
RIWKH8.¶V(8SRSXODWLRQLQHDFK\HDU, respectively (Table 1). 
 
The accounts of Polish handymen interviewed in Kilkey and colleagues¶ study help explain the 
pattern observed in the data. The men emphasized a tendency to stay rather than to return: 
µWell, my friends, the ones that I know, are still here¶ (Jan, interviewed by Kilkey and 
colleagues, 2009); µpeople try to wait for the end of it. 7KH\GRQ¶WZDQWWRJREDFNWR3RODQG¶ 
(Franek, interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). For some, the decision to stay was 
because the passage of time had produced new attachments to the UK, as in the case of Wiktor, 
who initially came for a µshort period¶ but µfound a woman and now the life looks different¶ 
(Interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009). :LNWRU¶V H[SHULHQFHV FOHDUO\ LOOXVWUDWH WKH
importance of relationality and linked lives in migrant decision-making, emphasizing a life-
FRXUVHIUDPHZRUN¶Vrelevance for understanding migration projects. 
 
Professional attachments, developed over time in one place, could also hinder return or 
migration elsewhere, even in the context of recession. Marzena and her husband ran a web 
portal linking British customers to Polish handymen. Marzena commented:  
We have been talking about this [return] many times. I think that finally, we would like 
to go back to Poland. However, it is difficult for us for many reasons because we have 
been here for a long time and there are things that we have got used to and they are 
common for us... We know how to run this business, what kind of receipts we need to 
FROOHFWZKDWZHFDQGHGXFWZKDWZHFDQ¶W:HGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\LGHDZKDWLWLVOLNHLQ
Poland.  
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Marzena went on to say: µ,¶PVXUSULVHGZLWKDOOWKHDUWLFOHVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHELJFRPH
back because I have many friends here, DQG , GRQ¶t know anybody who has gone back¶ 
(Interviewed by Kilkey and colleagues, 2009).  
 
The recession led to unsettling processes in the form of deteriorating financial circumstances 
and a more hostile environment toward Polish migrants, potentially disrupting pre-existing 
migration projects. As such, it could be expected to have pushed them into using their FoM 
rights to return to Poland or move to another EU country. This prediction, however, was not 
borne out by the data (Table 1), and tKHKDQG\PHQ¶VDFFRXQWV in this period highlight tendencies 
toward extending their stays in the UK. The rationale behind this tendency lay in the 
situatedness of their living in the UK, constituted by a combination of personal relationships 
that had developed over the life course and µHPSODFHGFDSLWDO¶ (Ryan and Mulholland 2014), 
which the handymen had also developed over time and in relation to the UK specifically.  
 
The Brexit referendum  
Our Brexit public event occurred 18 months after the referendum and in the midst of the first 
round of negotiations between the UK government and the European Council, in which the 
rights of EU citizens living in the UK were a main area of contention (Kilkey 2017). 
Responding voluntarily to the question, µ:KDWLV\RXUPDLQFRQFHUQIRU(81DWLRQDOVLQWKH
UK after Brexit?,¶SDUWLFLSDQWV wrote on post cards, as described earlier, to express fears about 
their and their relatives' future legal status, including their residency, employment, and welfare 
rights. $6SDQLVKUHVSRQGHQWH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQDERXWµORVLQJHYHU\WKLQJ¶KHVKHKDGZRUNHG
for in the UK. Many expressed fear that Brexit would become 'an excuse for discrimination 
towards not only Europeans, but nationals of other countries' (Polish participant). A respondent 
from the Netherlands ZDVFRQFHUQHGDERXWEHLQJWUHDWHGOLNHDµVHFRQGFODVVFLWL]HQ,¶ZKLOH
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VRPHRQH IURP %XOJDULD ZRUULHG DERXW EHLQJ ORRNHG RQ µDV OHVV RI D SHUVRQ¶ A Slovakian 
SHUVRQ ZDV IHDUIXO DERXW LQFUHDVLQJ µKDWUHG DQG DEXVH¶ These responses clearly illustrate 
%UH[LW¶V transformative dimensions, as an unsettling event with GLVUXSWLRQVWR(8PLJUDQWV¶
feelings and emotions around belonging and security following from uncertainties about their 
future socio-legal status in the UK.  
 
Concerns about 'hurt' and/or potential for 'hurt' have been defined by Waite, Valentine, and 
Lewis (2014: 315) as 'feeling uncertainty, fear, pain, anxiety and so on' and as experienced 
'bodily, materially and psychologically' (320). For some, such fears amounted to a sense of 
ontological insecurity (Giddens 1990). As one participant put it, since the Brexit referendum, 
he/she felt OLNHµDIORDWLQJORJLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKHRFHDQ
QRorigin country given). Similarly, 
DQRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVSRNHDERXWIHHOLQJµLQOLPER¶*HUPDQSDUWLFLSDQWThese fears highlight 
the deeply unsettling effect of the Brexit process on EU migrants at the subjective level. Despite 
the potential for such unsettling to disrupt their plans, several respondents hoped to stay in the 
UK. This hope was partly because returning to their origin country was not an easy option: 
'moving back to one's home country is by no means straightforward due to housing issues, 
finding qualified work, getting into health insurance, transfer saving without double taxation, 
etc.' (German participant 1). For some, the passage of time also implied a distancing from their 
KRPHFRXQWU\ µWKH8.PDNHVPH IHHO OLNe a visitor, but I have been here so long that the 
FRXQWU\ RI P\ RULJLQ LV VWUDQJH WR PH¶ *HUPDQ SDUWLFLSDQW ). This quote is similar to 
0DU]HQD¶VDERYHDQGIXUWKHU underlines that migration projects are situated within particular 
places imbued with meaning and value (Elder et al. 2003, 12). $QXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPLJUDQWV¶
place attachments, therefore, is central to analysis of their experiences and reactions to 
unsettling events. 
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These reactions to Brexit seem at odds with the narrative of µBrexodus¶ (McKiernan 2017; 
Shapira 2018), which predicts that EU migrants will react by leaving the UK in large numbers. 
The referendum result came as a huge shock for many migrants in the UK, unsettling migratory 
strategies and future plans (Guma and Jones 2019). Possibilities for transnational mobility, 
extending the stay, and keeping plans µopen¶ were replaced, for research participants, by 
narratives of securing status and affirming rights to stay. Thus, in contrast to the dominant 
µ%UH[RGXV¶QDUUDWLYH6KDSLUDDPRUHQXDQFHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIPLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVLV
required to understand the different reactions to Brexit and the factors behind them. Population 
and migration data (Table 1) indicate a decrease in the number of Polish-born migrants in the 
UK since the referendum and an increase in outflows of EU8 nationals in the same period. 
Outflows in the year ending June 2019, however, were only three percent of the 8.¶V EU8 
population in that year; in other words, 97 percent of EU8 nationals did not leave. Moreover, 
since the referendum, applications for UK citizenship by EU citizens have been increasing: 
among EU8, they were up from 5,690 in 2016 to 15,291 in 2018 and 8215 in the first two 
quarters of 2019; among Polish migrants the corresponding increase was from 3539 to 9545 
and 5234 in the first two quarters of 2019 (Home Office 2019). As discussed below, changing 
strategies may partly reflect the fact that migrants had been already engaged in extending their 
stays but without seeing any need to seek UK citizenship status. It is important to understand 
that FoM not only gave EU citizens the right to move but also to remain indefinitely without 
the need to change their immigration status. Brexit threatens to transform those rights to remain 
and hence requires migrants to take action to secure their status. 
 
In Summer 2016, Louise re-contacted her Polish participants and asked about their reactions 
to the referendum result. The data are used here not only to demonstrate %UH[LW¶Vunsettling and 
potentially transformative impact but also to further our analysis of longitudinal data through 
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the life-course lens. Through repeated interviews over many years, we can see how 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ initial migration plans altered considerably. Hence, we argue, rather than seeing 
Brexit as a unique, isolated unsettling event to which migrants responded, it is important to 
take the long-term view to understand how their reactions were framed by linked lives evolving 
in place and over time. 
 
Ewa, introduced earlier, VDLGµ2Qthe day after the vote, I actually couldn't stop crying. The 
loss of belonging to Europe, the aggressiveness of the out campaign, it was all too much, too 
VDG¶Interviewed by Ryan, 2016). Nonetheless, most participants re-interviewed in 2016 stated 
that they planned to stay in the UK, at least for the foreseeable future. To do so, they either had 
already or would soon apply for British citizenship. Having lived in London for several years, 
they had invested too much to leave. For most, going back to Poland was not a viable financial 
option. With children in local schools and partners in local jobs, moving to a third country was 
usually not an option either.  
 
Mateusz, introduced in the previous section, had lived in Britain since 1998. When interviewed 
by Louise in 2014, he had completed his nursing studies and was working as a psychiatric nurse 
in the National Health Service. He had also met and married a Polish woman in London, had 
two children, and secured British citizenship. Re-interviewed two years later, following the 
referendum, he now felt like an µimmigrant¶ again amid rising xenophobia. Nonetheless, having 
lived in London for 18 years, KHSODQQHGWRVWD\µP\KRPHP\IDPLO\P\ZRUN, DUHDOOKHUH¶
(Interviewed by Ryan, 2016). 
 
Similarly, Magda, previously discussed, intended to remain. When re-interviewed by Louise 
LQ0DJGD¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHVKDGFKDQJHGenormously since her first interview in 2006. 
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Having completed her studies, she was working as a project coordinator for a large multi-
national corporation. She had split from her Polish boyfriend and started a relationship with a 
British man, with whom she had a four-year-old daughter. Contrary to her initial expectations, 
she no longer felt the need to raise her children in Poland. After living in the UK for ten years, 
she remarked, µZH¶YH VWDUWHG FUHDWLQJ RXU KRPH RXU OLWWOH IDPLO\« I had Sara [daughter], 
which kind of contributed to the feeling of, well ok, this is my home. This is where my family 
is. This is where my daughter was born, and I think this is where I will stay¶ Thus, in line with 
many other participants in Louise¶VVWXG\0DJGD¶VSODQVHYROYHGRYHUWLPH, through the 
life-course, in close relation to significant others, from short term, temporary, and transient 
toward gradual embedding in place (Ryan 2018). By the time of her third interview in 2016, 
she had attained British citizenship and said that Brexit did not affect her plans. She was well 
established in her career and had built a home with her British partner and their young daughter. 
 
Klaudia, introduced earlier, had initially been very uncertain about how long she would stay in 
London. Her plans, however, also evolved through the life course. Following the birth of her 
second child and her older son starting school, Klaudia began to feel more settled in London. 
When interviewed in 2014, she had recently qualified as a teacher and was excited about 
starting a new career. Although she and her husband had separated, Klaudia did not plan to 
return to Poland, as she felt that, as a single mother, she had more opportunities both 
economically and socially in the UK. When re-contacted after the Brexit referendum in 2016, 
Klaudia reflected on WKLVXQVHWWOLQJHYHQW¶Vpotentially disruptive impact: µwe were in shock« 
even scared about the future. I couldn't believe what had happened« I feel hugely disappointed 
with politicians in this country¶Interviewed by Ryan, 2016). Nonetheless, Klaudia planned to 
stay in London, even though she was UHOXFWDQWWRDSSO\IRU%ULWLVKFLWL]HQVKLSµI hope I won't 
have to¶ 
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These quotes reflect many of the themes identified in our Brexit public event data and suggest 
that despite feelings of anger, resentment, and even fear at the referendum results, EU citizens 
who had made long-term investments in the UK could not simply pack up and leave. In this 
respect, the responses to Brexit are not dissimilar from those we observed for the recession. 
Our data collected over more than a decade and analyzed through the life-course lens enable 
us to understand the ways in which migrants become situated in particular places over time 
through processes of embedding. In so doing, we offer deeper insights, beyond the narrow 
Brexodus narrative, to understand the varied ways in which EU migrants may react to 
unsettling events. 
 
Conclusion  
In this article, we have introduced the notion of unsettling events to understand how migrants 
may respond to potentially disruptive structural transformations and, thus, go beyond simple 
predictions of a Brexodus. In the context of EU FoM, which, according to King (2018), is 
informed by a neo-classical rational choice model of migration, research has focused on 
mobility rights and assumed that migrants will respond to changing circumstances by moving 
elsewhere (Engbersen and Snel 2013). This assumption is especially apparent in the Brexodus 
narrative (McKiernan 2017; Shapira 2018). However, we underline here that FoM entitles EU 
citizens not only to move but also to stay indefinitely and that less attention has been paid to 
those processes of extending the stay in place over time (see Bygnes and Erdal 2018). Drawing 
on longitudinal data and adopting a life-course lens, we have shown how initial short-term, 
temporary migrations may become gradually extended as relationships develop and migrants 
begin embedding in places of destination (Ryan 2018).  Hence, we have made clear that 
PLJUDQWV¶ UHVSRQVHV WR %UH[LW must be understood against the backdrop of their life-course 
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experiences, which include two prior interlinked unsettling events - the 2004 EU enlargement 
and the 2008-09 economic recession. 
 
Going further, we have argued throughout this article that much of the emerging literature on 
(8PLJUDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRBrexit treats it as a unique and isolated event (e.g., Guma and Jones 
2018; Lulle, 0RURúDQXDQG King 2018; Lulle et al. 2019; Ranta and Nancheva, 2018). Instead, 
taking a longer-term view, we have used the notion of unsettling events to examine a series of 
separate but interlinked geopolitical transformations with the potential to disrupt migration 
projects. Focusing on EU enlargement, the economic recession, and Brexit as a series of 
interlinked unsettling events and combining qualitative data from different studies with Polish 
migrants, we have explored how these structural transformations have contributed to informing 
evolving migration projects over time. EU enlargement triggered large-scale migration, 
particularly from Poland to the UK. In this sense, EU FoM facilitated considerable mobility, 
sparking much academic and public debate about new migration patterns (Engbersen and Snel 
2011). However, rather than simply assuming that Brexit, as another unsettling event, will have 
the same impact and provoke considerable mobility out of the UK, our analysis of responses 
to Brexit, and to the economic recession some years earlier, suggests a more nuanced picture.  
 
During the recession, EU migrants were predicted to move (Pollard, Latorre, and 
Sriskandarajah 2008; Glossop and Shaheen 2009; Finch et al. 2009; Engbersen and Snel 2013) 
but, as we have shown, they did not do so in significant numbers. How can this pattern be 
explained? While most EU8 citizens who moved to the UK after 2004, especially Poles, were 
in their 20s and single (Okolski and Salt 2014), the life-course lens allows us to understand 
how migration projects change over time. As we have shown, initial temporariness evolved 
into a gradual process of embedding. As migrants developed linked lives in particular places 
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(Elder 1998), moving became more complex and less attractive, even in the face of 
deterioration in their material circumstances during the recession. Now at the point of Brexit, 
15 years have elapsed for those who arrived in the enlargHPHQW¶Vimmediate aftermath. With 
the passage of time, the Polish population in the UK has changed, with most now aged over 30 
(House of Commons 2016). Our longitudinal research reveals the continuities of processes of 
embedding and, thus, that despite their anger, sadness, and resentment about Brexit, 
participants were planning to stay in the UK. These qualitative data help make sense of trends 
in the official migration datasets (as depicted in Table 1 and in Home Office 2019) and 
contribute to understandings of why, despite %UH[LW¶Vuncertainties, migrants are not leaving in 
significant numbers. 
 
To conclude, then, we argue, Brexit should not be analyzed as a unique and isolated event, and 
lessons can be learned DERXW PLJUDQWV¶ SRWHQWLDO UHVSRQVHV WR %UH[LW by looking back at 
previous interlinked unsettling events. As argued earlier in this article, much of the emerging 
scholarship on migration and Brexit is limited by a lack of longitudinal data; hence our article 
reveals the value of the methodological innovation of combining data from separate, but 
related, studies, especially longitudinal data, to expanding the empirical basis for analysis of 
evolving migration projects over time. Although we focused mainly on Poles, the findings from 
our public event, with a more diverse group of EU citizens, suggest some common reactions to 
Brexit. Moreover, while RXUDUWLFOH¶Vfocus has been on the specific context of EU citizens in 
the UK, our methodological approach and notion of unsettling events may be useful in other 
contexts as well. 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We wish to thank our colleagues Sarah Neal and Julie Walsh, University of Sheffield, Izabela 
Grabowska, SWPS University Warsaw, and Michaela Benson, Goldsmiths University, who 
read early drafts of this article. We are grateful to the editor and three anonymous reviewers 
34 
 
for their detailed and constructive feedback. .LONH\¶V research was funded by the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC), Award RES-000-22-2590, Situating Men in Global Care 
Chains: the migrant handyman phenomenon (2008-10). 5\DQ¶V UHVHDUFKZDV IXQGHGE\ WKH 
ESRC, Award RES-000221552, Recent Polish Migrants in London: social networks, 
transience and settlement (2006-08). The Brexit public event in Sheffield, November 2017, 
was funded by the ESRC as part of the annual Festival of Social Science. We wish to thank our 
colleagues who collaborated with us in this event: Hannah Lewis, Aneta Piekut, and Julie 
Walsh, Migration Research Group, University of Sheffield.   
35 
 
References 
Ackers, L. 1998 Shifting Spaces. Women, citizenship and migration within the European 
Union. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
$FNHUV /  ³&LWL]HQVKLS PLJUDWLRQ DQG WKH YDOXLQJ RI FDUH´ Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies. 30(2): 373-96. 
 
Adam, B. 2000 ³The temporal gaze: the challenge for social theory in the context of GM 
food.´ The British Journal of Sociology 51(1): 125-42. 
 
Benson, M. and C. Lewis 2019 ³Brexit, British People of Colour in the EU-27 and everyday 
racism in Britain and Europe.´ Ethnic and Racial Studies 42(13): 2211-28.  
 
%RUMDV*³6HOI-VHOHFWLRQDQGWKHHDUQLQJVRILPPLJUDQWV´American Economic Review 
77(4): 531-53. 
 
Boswell, C. and A. Geddes 2011. Migration and Mobility in the European Union. London: 
Macmillan International. 
 
Brannen, J. 2013 "Life story talk: Some reflections on narrative in qualitative interviews." 
Sociological Research Online 18(2): no page numbers. 
 
Bruzelius, C., E. Chase, and M. Seeleib-Kaiser 2016 ³Social Rights of EU Migrant Citizens: 
%ULWDLQDQG*HUPDQ\&RPSDUHG³Social Policy & Society 15(3): 403±16. 
 
36 
 
Bygnes, S. and M. B. Erdal 2017 "Liquid migration, grounded lives: considerations about 
future mobility and settlement among Polish and Spanish migrants in Norway." Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(1): 102-18. 
 
Carling, J. 2017 ³On conjunctures in transnational lives: linear time, relative mobility and 
individual experience.´ In Timespace and International Migration, edited by E. Mavroudi, B. 
Page, and A. Christou, 33-47. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
&ROOLQV)/DQG66KXELQ³0LJUDQWWLPHVEH\RQGWKHOLIHFRXUVH7KHtemporalities of 
foreign English teachers in South Korea.´Geoforum 62(2015): 96-104. 
 
Corden, A. and J. Millar 2007 ³Time and change: A review of the qualitative longitudinal 
research literature for social policy.´ Social Policy and Society 6(4): 583-92. 
 
&ZHUQHU6%³7KH7LPHVRI0LJUDWLRQ.´Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
27(1): 7-36. 
 
Czaikam M. and A. 'L/LOOR³7KHJHRJUDSK\RIDQWL-immigrant attitudes across Europe, 
2002±´Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(15): 2453-79.  
 
Eade, J., M.P. Garapich, and S. Drinkwater 'HPRJUDSKLF0LJUDWLRQFRQWH[W%ULWDLQ¶V
ethnic diversity and recent migration from the A8 countries." National Inquiry into Lifelong 
Learning. 
 
Elder, G. 1998 ³The Life Course as Developmental Theory.´ Child Development 69(1): 1-12. 
37 
 
 
Elder, G.H., M. Kirkpatrick Johnson, and 5&URVQRH³7KH(PHUJHQFHDQG'HYHORSPHQW
RI/LIH&RXUVH7KHRU\´,QHandbook of the Life Course, edited by J.T. Mortimer and M.J. 
Shanahan, 3-19. New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers. 
 
Engbersen, G. and E. 6QHO  ³/LTXLG 0LJUDWLRQ '\QDPLF DQG IOXLG SDWWHUQV RI SRVW-
DFFHVVLRQPLJUDWLRQ IORZV´ ,Q Mobility in Transition, edited by B. Glorius, I. Grabowska-
Lusinska and A. Kuvik, 21-40. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
 
Engbersen, G., E. Snel, and J. De Boom 2010 $YDQIXOORI3ROHV¶/LTXLGPLJUDWLRQIURP
Central and Eastern Europe." In A Continent Moving West?: EU Enlargement and Labour 
Migration from Central and Eastern Europe, edited by R. Black, G. Engbersen, M. Okólski 
DQG&3DQĠvUX-40. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
 
Erel, U. and L. Ryan 2019 ³Migrant capitals: Proposing a multi-level Spatio-temporal 
analytical framework.´ Sociology 53(2): 246-63. 
 
Favell, A. 2008 "The new face of East±West migration in Europe." Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 34(5): 701-16. 
 
)LKHO $ DQG , *UDERZVNDဨ/XVLQVND  /DERXU 0DUNHW %HKDYLRXUV RI %DFNဨDQGဨ)RUWK
Migrants From Poland." International Migration 52(1): 22-35. 
 
Finch, T., M. Latorre, N. Pollard and J. Rutter 2009 Shall We Stay Stay Or Shall We Go? Re-
PLJUDWLRQWUHQGVDPRQJ%ULWDLQ¶VLPPLJUDQWV. London: IPPR. 
38 
 
 
)LW]JHUDOG , DQG 5 6PRF]\QVNL  ³Anti-Polish Migrant Moral Panic in the UK: 
Rethinking Employment Insecurities and Moral Regulation.´ Czech Sociological Review 
51(3): 339-61. 
 
Gawlewicz, A. and T. Sotkasiira 2019 ³5HYLVLWLQJ JHRJUDSKLHV RI WHPSRUDOLWLHV 7KH
VLJQLILFDQFH RI WLPH LQ PLJUDQW UHVSRQVHV WR %UH[LW´ Population, Space and Place 
DOI.org/10.1002/psp.2275. 
 
Giddens, A. 1990 The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
*LHU\Q7³$6SDFHIRU3ODFHLQ6RFLRORJ\´Annual Review of Sociology 26: 463-96. 
 
Glossop, C. and F. Shaheen 2009 Accession to Recession: A8 Migration in Bristol and Hull. 
Centre for Cities. 
 
*UHJJ3DQG-:DGVZRUWK³(PSOR\PHQW LQ WKH- UHFHVVLRQ´Economic & 
Labour Market Review 4(8): 37-43. 
 
Griffiths, M., A. Rogers, and B. Anderson 2013 ³Migration, Time and Temporalities: Review 
and Prospect´ COMPAS Research Resources Paper, March. 
https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2013/migration-time-and-temporalities-review-and-prospect/. 
Accessed 28/09/19.   
 
39 
 
Grundmann, R., K. Kreischer and M. Scott 2017 ³7KHGLVFRXUVHRI DXVWHULW\ LQ WKH%ULWLVK
Press´,QAusterity: A Journey to an Unknown Territory, edited by R. Sturm, T. Griebel and 
T. Winkelmann (92-128). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. 
 
Grzymala-Kazlowska, A. 2016 "Social anchoring: Immigrant identity, security and integration 
reconnected?." Sociology 50(6): 1123-39. 
 
*XPD7DQG-RQHV5'³´:KHUHDUHZHJRLQJWRQRZ"´(XURSHDQ8QLRQPLJUDQWV¶
experiences of hostility, anxiety, and (non-)belonging during Brexit.´Population, Space and 
Place 25(1) DOI 10.1002/psp.2198. 
 
Home Office 2017 Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016-2017. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2016-to-2017  
Accessed 17/10/17. 
 
Home Office 2019 Immigration Statistics, year ending June 2019, Second Edition 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-june-2019 
Accessed 25/09/19. 
 
House of Commons Library 2016 ³Polish Population of the United Kingdom´, Briefing Paper 
Number CBP7660 www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-
library | papers@parliament.uk. Accessed 18/09/2019. 
 
Kilkey, M. 2017 ³Conditioning Family-life at the Intersection of Migration and Welfare: The 
Implications for µBrexit Families¶´ Journal of Social Policy 46(4): 797-814. 
40 
 
 
Kilkey, M. and L. Merla 2014 ³6LWXDWLQJ7UDQVQDWLRQDO)DPLOLHV¶&DUH-giving Arrangements: 
the role of institutional contexts´ Global Networks. A Journal of Transnational Affairs 14(2): 
210-29. 
 
Kilkey, M., D. Perrons, and A. Plomien with P. Hondagneu-Sotelo and H. Ramirez 2013 
Gender, Migration and Domestic Work: Masculinities, Male Labour and Fathering in the UK 
and USA.  London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kilkey, M., A. Plomien, and D. Perrons 2014 ³0LJUDQWPHQ¶VIDWKHULQJSUDFWLFHVDQGSURMHFWV
in national and transnational spaces: recent 3ROLVKPDOHPLJUDQWV WR/RQGRQ´ International 
Migration 52(1): 178-91. 
 
.LQJ5³7KHRULVLQJQHZ(XURSHDQ\RXWKPRELOLWLHV´Population, Space and Place, 
24(1) DOI: 10.1002/psp.2117. 
 
.LQJ507KRPVRQ7)LHOGLQJDQG7:DUQHV³7LPH*HQHUDWLRQVDQG*HQGHULQ
Migration and Settlement.´ ,Q The Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in 
Europe: a state of the art, edited by R. Penninx, M. Berger and K. Kraal, 233-68. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press. 
 
Lulle, A., R. King, V. Dvorakova and A. 6]NXGODUHN  ³%HWZHHQ GLVUXSWLRQV DQG
FRQQHFWLRQV µ1HZ¶ (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ PLJUDQWV LQ WKH 8. EHIRUH DQG DIWHU WKH %UH[LW´
Population, Space and Place DOI 10.1002/psp.2200. 
 
41 
 
Lulle, A., L. 0RURúDQX DQG R. .LQJ³$QG WKHQFDPH%UH[LW([SHULHQFHVDQG IXWXUH
SODQVRI\RXQJ(8PLJUDQWVLQWKH/RQGRQUHJLRQ´Population, Space and Place 24(1) DOI: 
10.1002/psp.2122. 
 
Luthra, R., L. Platt, and - 6DODPRĔVND 2018 ³7\SHV RI 0LJUDWLRQ 7KH 0RWLYDWLRQV
&RPSRVLWLRQ DQG (DUO\ ,QWHJUDWLRQ 3DWWHUQV RI ³1HZ 0LJUDQWV´ LQ (XURSH´ International 
Migration Review 52(2): 368-403. 
 
Mavroudi, E., B. Page, and A. Christou 2017. Timespace and International Migration. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
McGhee, D., C. Moreh, and A. Vlachantoni 2017 ³$Q µXQGHOLEHUDWH GHWHUPLQDF\¶" 7KH
changing migration strategies of Polish migrants in the UK in times of Brexit´ Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(13): 2109-30. 
 
0F.LHUQDQ-µ%UH[RGXV¶WRKLW$EHUGHHQKDUGDVQHDUO\KDOIRI(8FLWL]HQVVD\WKH\
will leave Scotland. The Press and Journal, 7th September 2017 
 
McKie, L., S. Gregory and S. Bowlby 2002 ³Shadow times the temporal and spatial 
frameworks and experiences of caring and working.´ Sociology 36(4): 897-924. 
 
0LOOHU5*³8QVHWWOLQJKRPHGXULQJWKH%UH[LWSURFHVV.´Population, Space and Place 
25(1) DOI 10.1002/psp.2203. 
 
42 
 
Neale, B., K. Henwood, and J. Holland 2012 ³Researching lives through time: an introduction 
to the Timescapes approach.´ Qualitative Research 12(1): 4-15. 
 
2NyOVNL 0  ³0LJUDWLRQ SDWWHUQV LQ &HQWUDO DQG (DVWHUQ (XURSH RQ WKH HYH RI WKH
(XURSHDQ8QLRQH[SDQVLRQ´,QMigration in the New Europe. East-West Revisited, edited 
by A. Górny and P. Ruspini, 23±48. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
2NyOVNL0DQG-6DOW³Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004; Why Did So Many 
&RPH"´&HQWUDODQG(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQ0LJUDWLRQ5HYLHZ-37. 
 
ONS 2019  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internation
almigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality 
Accessed 25/09/19. 
 
ONS 2019 Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2019. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internation
almigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/november2019 Accessed 01/12/19.  
 
3DSDGRSRXORV ' DQG 9 7VLDQRV  ³7KH $XWRQRP\ RI 0LJUDWLRQ 7KH $QLPDOV RI
8QGRFXPHQWHG0RELOLW\´,QDeleuzian Encounters. Studies in Contemporary Social Issues, 
edited by A. Hickey-Moody and P. Malins, 223-35. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Pollard, N., M. Latorre, and D. Sriskandarajah 2008 Floodgates or Turnstiles? Post-EU 
enlargement flows to (and from) the UK. London: IPPR. 
43 
 
 
Plummer, K. 1995 Telling Sexual Stories. London: Routledge 
 
5DQWD5DQG1DQFKHYD1³8QVHWWOHG%UH[LWDQG(XURSHDQ8QLRQQDWLRQDOV¶VHQVHRI
belonging.´Population, Space and Place 25(1) DOI 10.1002/psp.2199. 
 
Recchi, E. and A. Favell (eds) 2009 Pioneers of European Integration. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
5\DQ/³0LJUDQWV
VRFLDOQHWZRUNVDQGZHDNWLHVDFFHVVLQJUHVRXUFHVDQGFRQVWUXFWLQJ
relationships post-migration.´The Sociological Review 59(4): 707-24. 
 
Ryan, L. 2015 ³µ,W
V'LIIHUHQW1RZ¶$Narrative Analysis of Recent Irish Migrants Making 
Sense of Migration and Comparing Themselves with Previous Waves of Migrants.´ Irish 
Journal of Sociology 23(2): 114-32. 
 
Ryan, L. 2018 ³Differentiated embedding: Polish migrants in London negotiating belonging 
over time.´ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(2): 233-51. 
 
Ryan, L., R. Sales, M. Tilki, and B. Siara 2008 ³Social networks, social support and social 
capital: The experiences of recent Polish migrants in London.´ Sociology 42(4): 672-90. 
 
Ryan, L., R. Sales, M. Tilki, and B. Siara 2009 ³Family strategies and transnational migration: 
recent Polish migrants in London.´ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(1): 61-77. 
 
44 
 
Ryan, L. and R. Sales 2013 ³Family migration: the role of children and education in family 
GHFLVLRQဨPDNLQJVWUDWHJLHVRIPolish migrants in London.´ International Migration, 51(2): 90-
103. 
 
Ryan, L. and J. Mulholland 2014 ³Trading places: French highly skilled migrants negotiating 
mobility and emplacement in London.´ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(4): 584-
600. 
 
Ryan, L. and J. Mulholland 2015 ³Embedding in motion: Analysing relational, spatial and 
temporal dynamics among highly skilled migrants.´ In Migrant Capital, edited by Ryan, L., U. 
Erel DQG$'¶$QJHOR, 135-53. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Ryan, L. M.L. Rodriguez and P. Trevena 2016 ³Opportunities and challenges of unplanned 
follow-up interviews: Experiences with Polish migrants in London.´ Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung, 17(2). http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1602266. Accessed 
18/09/2019. 
 
Rzepnikowska, A. 2019 ³5DFLVPDQG[HQRSKRELDH[SHULHQFHGE\3ROLVK migrants in the UK 
EHIRUHDQGDIWHU%UH[LWYRWH´Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45(1): 61-77. 
 
Sjaastad, L. 1962 "The costs and returns of human migration." Journal of Political Economy 
70S: 80-93. 
 
6FKHZHO.³8QGHUVWDQGLQJ,PPRELOLW\0RYLQJ%H\RQGWKH0RELOLW\%LDVLQ0LJUDWLRQ
Studies.´International Migration Review DOI: 10.1177/019791831952. 
45 
 
 
6KDSLUD0³%UH[RGXVRI(8FLWL]HQVIURPWKH8.LVSLFNLQJXSVSHHG´The 
Conversation 22/02/18 http://theconversation.com/brexodus-of-eu-citizens-from-the-uk-is-
picking-up-speed-92089. Accessed 28/09/19. 
 
Stanley, L. 2015 ³The scriptural economy, the Forbes figuration and the racial order: Everyday 
life in South Africa 1850±1930.´ Sociology 49(5): 837-852. 
 
6WUXPLD)³6XSUDQDWLRQDO&LWL]HQVKLS´,QThe Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, edited 
by A. Shachar, R. Baubock, I. Bloemraad and M. Vink. Oxford Handbooks Online. 
 
Thomson, R. 2007 ³The qualitative longitudinal case history: Practical, methodological and 
ethical reflections.´ Social Policy and Society 6(4): 571-82.  
 
Todaro, M. 1969 "A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less-developed 
countries." The American Economic Review 59: 138-48.  
 
Virdee, S. DQG%0F*HHYHU³5DFLVPFULVLV%UH[LW´ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41(10): 
1802-19. 
 
Waite, L., G. Valentine and H. Lewis 2014 ³Multiply vulnerable populations: mobilising a 
SROLWLFVRIFRPSDVVLRQIURPWKHµFDSDFLW\WRKXUW¶´ Social & Cultural Geography 15(3): 313-
31. 
 
46 
 
White, A., I. Grabowska, P. Kaczmarczyk and K. Slany 2018 The Impact of migration on 
Poland: EU mobility and social change. London: UCL Press. 
 
White, A. 2011 Polish Families and Migration Since EU Accession. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
<EDUUD 9' /0 6DQFKH] DQG *5 6DQFKH]  ³$QWL-immigrant Anxieties in State 
Policy: The Great Recession and Punitive Immigration Policy in the American States, 2005±
´State Politics & Policy Quarterly 16(3): 313±39. 
 
 
 
 
